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1 Introduction
Early career research production not only helps to determine the long term impact of the research
of an academic, but also provides useful information that affects job offers, tenure decisions and
promotions in academia. An important factor that may be informative for making accurate pre-
dictions about the future performance of young graduates in academia is the education that they
received during their doctoral training. Indeed, as indicated by Long and McGinnis (1985), the
effects of education on the careers of academics act through two main channels. Firstly, the aca-
demic department provides an environment where quality and quantity ingredients foster students’
performance during and after their doctoral training. Secondly, since faculty composition within
departments is likely to be heterogeneous in willingness and style of advising, a good supervisor
can shape abilities through teaching, mentorship and collaboration above and beyond what the
department can do. Apart from playing a fundamental role in the transmission of knowledge, the
supervisor influences the formation of academic habits, can facilitate access to research networks,
and may participate in joint academic projects with the advisee.1
The aim of this paper is to assess the extent to which advisory supervision, in addition to overall
department quality, has an effect on the early stage productivity of recent PhDs in economics. We
define productivity as the quality adjusted number of publications within six years after graduation.
Data on publications and supervisor-supervisee relationships are obtained from RePEc, a worldwide
project that collects comprehensive information on academics in economics and related areas. The
RePEc data link authors with research products (working papers, articles, book chapters and
software components), number of citations and, most importantly, specific information on academic
genealogy that connects graduates with their advisors. Our main regression results use a sample
of 2,223 individuals who obtained a PhD in Economics between the years of 2005 and 2010. Their
academic production is observed over a 9-year window, starting 2 years before the completion of
their degree, and ending 6 years after that.
This comprehensive data source has a number of advantages relative to those used in the
prior literature that often relied on information from surveys or professional associations and were
limited to particular regions, fields or departments. First, it allows us to construct more accurate
productivity measures for students, advisors and institutions that are superior to rough binary
classifications used elsewhere (e.g. Top 30 economics department, Top 250 most productive – or
1For a personal perspective on the benefits of academic collaboration with colleagues and students alike, see
Baumol (1997).
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star – advisor, publication in a Top 5 journal). Here, we focus on specific measures of productivity,
namely the number of published articles with and without adjustment by the impact factor of the
journal. Second, it is comprehensive regarding region, field and type of employment. This is in
sharp contrast to the overwhelming majority of existing studies which exhibit a region bias (for
instance, data from US departments, European departments or country-specific; see e.g. Cardoso
et al. (2010) and Brostro¨m (2018)) or focus on a group of selected universities.2 Also, it comprises
all graduates, including those affiliated to non-academic institutions (such as research centers and
multilateral organizations dedicated to academic research), who are not usually considered in similar
analyses in economics and other sciences, see e.g. Long and McGinnis (1981). Third, and finally,
we can identify specific collaborations between graduates and advisors as co-authors, which will be
an important aspect of our analysis.
Due to the tailor-made data set at our disposal, we are able to test two channels through which
advisors might have an effect on the research productivity of their students: quality, as evidenced
by the advisor’s own productivity, and intensive guidance and collaboration, as evidenced by co-
authorship. Our empirical analysis is intended to provide insights that are relevant for the design
of recruitment processes and also for the establishment of promotion rules. In addition, it could
allow prospective graduate students interested in pursuing academic careers in economics to make
better informed decisions.
For a preview of our main results, we find that academic productivity of graduates is positively
related to both program and advisor quality. While graduates from Top 25 institutions publish
on average half a paper less than others (4.7 as opposed to 5.2), they have a close to 100 percent
higher productivity when the quality of the journal is accounted for. The effect of advisor quality
is more nuanced: in non-Top 25 institutions, the effect is positive independently of whether there
is a co-authorship or not. In Top 25 institutions, there is a large return for co-authorship that
depends positively on advisor quality. Without co-authorship, the quality of the advisor does not
seem to matter for the productivity of graduates from such programs. Empirically, co-authorship
rates are substantially lower in Top 25 institutions (25%) than in non-Top 25 institutions (39%).
In summary, while graduates from Top 25 institutions are more productive overall in terms of
quality-adjusted output, this gap can be reduced by students in non-top institutions, when they
are advised by the most productive academics in that program.
While our results are robust to different econometric specifications (OLS or Poisson pseudo
2For instance, Cardoso et al. (2010) studies research productivity in labour economics while Hilmer and Hilmer
(2007) consider a sample of graduates from Top 30 universities.
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maximum likelihood), they do not necessarily imply causality, a limitation that is not specific to
our study but applies to most of the literature. For instance, it is likely that more academically
gifted students are placed in more selective PhD programs. Hence, the effect of program quality on
individual performance may be overstated. Arguably, the self-selection problem is less pernicuous
when it comes to the formation of advisor/advisee relationships within a program, as other factors,
such as field preferences, introduce an element of randomness. Moreover, from the point of view of
predicting future success of graduates in recruiting decisions, or grant funding decisions, our results
provide the relevant information: no causal effects are needed when the goal is prediction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short review of the
literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis,
while Section 5 concludes.
2 Review of the literature
A number of studies have looked into the relative contribution of advisors and academic departments
on the publication performance of young academics; see, inter alia, Long et al. (1979), Long and
McGinnis (1985), Long (1990) for studies in sciences, and Hilmer and Hilmer (2007) and Cardoso
et al. (2010) for the case of economics. These authors confirm that advisors play a major role in
the subsequent academic performance of advisees, and that this effect is even stronger when there
has been academic collaboration between them. In turn, existing evidence is less clear regarding
the quality of graduate programs in economics. For example, Conley and O¨nder (2014) indicate
that only a small percentage of economics PhDs in top-ranked departments are able to achieve a
creditable number of publications by their sixth year after graduation. According to the authors,
although this finding highlights the difficulties involved in becoming a successful researcher, it also
shows that one does not have to attend a top academic department to become successful.
Regarding demographic factors such as gender, Long (1990) observes that collaboration with
the mentor is by far the most significant determinant of scientific productivity, and that the oppor-
tunities for collaboration are significantly reduced for women by having children. Ginther and Kahn
(2004) find evidence that women in economics tend to have lower academic productivity, which in
turn affects negatively their chances of obtaining tenure. Hilmer and Hilmer (2007) also find that
female students, regardless of the gender of their advisors, have significantly fewer publications early
in their careers. On the other hand, Sarsons (2017) observes that men and women who publish
solo exhibit similar tenure and promotion rates, conditional on the quality of the papers, but there
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is a penalty for women publishing with men. This finding may indicate an implicit bias against
women which likely affects not only promotion but publishing success as well. As for an additional
demographic factor, Oster and Hamermesh (1998) find that the propensity to publishing in leading
journals declines with age, and that the few exceptions are those who were the most productive
during the early part of their academic careers.
In related economics literature, Johnson (1997) studies the determinants of the number of
citations of academic economists; Laband and Tollison (2000), Ductor et al. (2014), Ductor (2015),
Hsieh et al. (2017) and Colussi (2018) assess the effect of networks on academic productivity; Oster
and Hamermesh (1998) and Conley et al. (2013) study life-cycle research productivity; Franses
(2003) and Fok and Franses (2007) investigate the diffusion pattern of scientific publications; while
Heckman and Moktan (2018) examine the relationship between publication in Top 5 journals and
receipt of tenure in academic economics departments.
3 Data
The data used in the paper mainly come from Research Papers in Economics, RePEc. RePEc is
a collaborative effort of hundreds of volunteers that started in June 1997, under the leadership of
Thomas Krichel, with the purpose of enhancing the diffusion of research in economics and related
sciences.3 The main function of RePEc is to organise bibliographic data provided by commercial
and academic publishers (using a common format) and make it available in the public domain.
Zimmermann (2013) indicates that the considerable amount of data gathered by RePEc has become
the most important source of bibliographic information not only for economics but also for other
sciences. Indeed, at the time of writing, the RePEc website reports that over 1,900 repositories
from 98 countries have contributed more than 2.5 million items of research from journals, working
paper series, book (and book chapter) collections, and software components (in the form of usable
computer codes). In addition, there are more than 50,000 registered authors, who receive (via
email) monthly notifications with statistics on downloads and abstract views of their academic
production, as well as some citation notifications. RePEc also enables registered authors to link
their academic production with that of their institution(s) and co-authors.
The data collected in RePEc is distributed in a structured way in a number of so-called projects.
For the purposes of our research, the most relevant projects are: IDEAS, which contains the
bibliographic database; CitEc which offers citation analyses; Edirc which contains a directory of
3See http://repec.org/ for a general description of RePEc, and Zimmermann (2013) for further details on the
initiative.
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economic institutions with their affiliated researchers and publications; and Genealogy, which can
be thought of as an academic family tree for economists (currently listing close to 11,700 registered
individuals). A unique identifier, or “RePEc Short-ID” allows merging the information contained
in all individual projects.
We use web scraping techniques to retrieve the bibliographic data for all RePEc authors that
appear in the Genealogy project, their training institutions and their advisors, from RePEc Geneal-
ogy, LogEc and IDEAS, respectively.4 The total number of articles per registered author provides
a simple measure of academic production, but not of its quality. Thus, to adjust for the latter we
use the RePEc ranking of economics journals that (as of December 2016) was established using
information on the cumulative simple impact factor (defined as the ratio of the number of citations
by the number of items in each journal). RePEc data show that the Quarterly Journal of Economics
is the top economics journal, and so we use this information to compute the number of Quarterly
Journal of Economics equivalent articles, which we shall refer to as QJEe articles for short; see
Appendix A for the list of top journals.5
Similar measures of quality (or prestige) for institutions and advisors can be obtained using
information from RePEc. In the case of institutions, we employ the classification (as of December
2016) which ranks economic departments according to a score based on the harmonic mean of the
ranks of a number of different criteria including the number of distinct works, authors, citations,
views, and H-index, among others. For the purposes of our empirical analysis, the score of the
institutions is normalised between zero and one, where the Department of Economics of Harvard
University occupies the first position; the list of Top 25 departments is presented in Appendix B. As
for the prestige of the advisors, we construct a measure based on their cumulative QJEe academic
production up to four years before the year of graduation of the advisee. Therefore, it ought to
be noticed that despite the fact that our econometric analysis is based on cross-section data, the
prestige of an advisor changes depending on the moment in time in which they are chosen by the
student.
In addition to the bibliographic data mentioned above, it was also possible to obtain information
on the gender of the authors registered in RePEc Genealogy (for both advisors and advisees).
Since authors are not required to provide their gender during the registration process, we attribute
gender through an analysis of names along with a list of exceptions. To this end, we use the Ethnea
4The data were obtained in October 2017, using the software R and procedures written by the authors.
5Oswald (2007) argues that the prestige of a journal can be viewed as a short-term indicator of the quality of an
article. However, in the medium- to long-term the number of citations of the articles provides a better measure of its
quality.
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application, a computing tool that uses the first name, last name and ethnicity of an individual to
predict gender.6 Thus, for example, it is possible to distinguish between, let us say, Andrea Rossi,
most likely a male individual, and Andrea Pe´rez, most likely a female individual.7 Lastly, to have an
idea of the main field of research of an individual, we use information from New Economics Papers
(NEP). NEP is an announcement service created with the purpose of producing reports (generated
by subject-specific editors) on new additions to RePEc. Although NEP reports comprise a total of
97 subject categories, for our purposes we opt for grouping them into the classification employed
by the Journal of Economic Literature (JEL); see Appendix C for the field classification that we
adopted.
The study sample used in our econometric analysis consists of individuals who, according to the
RePEc Genealogy project, graduated between the years of 2005 and 2010. This amounts to a total
of 2,223 (out of the 11,700) individuals for whom we consider their academic production over a
9-year window which starts 2 years before the completion of their terminal degree, and ends 6 years
after that. This window length is consistent with earlier results by Conley et al. (2013) who find
that graduates in economics achieve the peak of their academic productivity between around the
fifth and seventh years after graduation. To validate this finding using RepEc data, we consider a
modified version of the sample based on the research output between -2/+9 years after graduation
for graduates between the years of 2002 and 2007.8
−−−−−−−−− Figure 1 about here −−−−−−−−−
Figure 1 displays the yearly academic production of graduates of the 2002-2007 cohorts. As can
be seen, the maximum level of productivity is achieved after 6 years of the terminal degree. The
same conclusion can be reached when the number of articles is expressed in terms of QJEe articles;
see panel b) of Figure 1.
4 Empirical analysis
Our empirical analysis revolves around the question of whether, and how much, advisor quality
and/or quality of the economics doctoral programs affect academic production during the first six
years after the completion of the terminal degree. To provide some preliminary evidence, Figure 2
6See http://abel.lis.illinois.edu/cgi-bin/ethnea/search.py.
7In about three hundred cases there were uncertain matches, which were all resolved through internet search of
the authors’ websites.
8Using 2017 data, it is not possible to compute academic production beyond 7 years for members of the 2005 to
2010 graduation cohorts.
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plots the average number of articles six years after graduation against advisor quality, where the
latter is measured in quintiles (error bars denote 95% confidence intervals). As can be seen, the
average number of articles does not appear to vary by the quality-quintile of the advisor.
−−−−−−−−− Figure 2 about here −−−−−−−−−
However, a very different picture emerges when the number of articles is adjusted by quality,
i.e., expressed in terms of QJE-equivalent papers, as is seen in panel b) of Figure 2. In this case,
there is a clear positive relationship between the number of QJEe articles six years after graduation
and advisor quality.
There are two possible channels through which advisors can have an effect on the productivity of
advisees. One is directly through co-authorships, the other is indirect through passing on know-how
of doing academic research. To disentangle these two channels, we display in panel b) of Figure 2
also the relationship between advisor quality and the number QJEe articles net of those co-authored
with the advisor. The positive relationship identified earlier is largely unaffected. Besides, there
does not appear to exist an association between the probability of co-authorship and the prestige
of the advisors.
Next, we consider evidence on the relationship between research performance of graduates and
institution quality. We distinguish two groups of institutions, namely those ranked in the Top 25,
and the rest. Figure 3 shows that when one looks at the number of articles, graduates from top
institutions tend to publish somewhat less than their counterparts from the rest of institutions (error
bars denote 95% confidence intervals). But in terms of quality-adjusted publications, graduates
from the Top 25 institutions publish about twice as much as their counterparts (see the lower panel
of Figure 3). In sum, this preliminary evidence supports the view that both institution and advisor
prestige are important determinants of early research performance among academic economists.
−−−−−−−−− Figure 3 about here −−−−−−−−−
4.1 Results from a linear regression model
To disentangle the contributions of advisor quality and that of economics departments, we esti-
mate several regression models for the determinants of early academic production. We specifically
consider two outcomes of interest, namely: the total number of QJEe articles (ArtQJEe), and the
total number of articles net of those co-authored with the advisor (ArtQJEeNet). The latter allows
us to assess whether the effect goes beyond the co-working between advisor and advisee, which
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is most likely related to the capability of the advisor to foster research abilities of the graduate.
For each individual in the sample, both ArtQJEe and ArtQJEeNet are computed within the 9-
year window (including the year of graduation). The regressions include a cumulative measure of
quality-adjusted academic production by the advisor at the moment he/she is chosen by the ad-
visee, which is assumed to have occurred four years before graduation year (AdvQJEe), a normalised
measure of the quality of the economics department (UniRank) which is a continuous variable in
the unit interval based on the (December 2016) RePEc classification, where 1 is the top economics
department (the value for those departments that are not included among the Top 25 is set equal to
zero), a variable that measures advisor tenure given by the number of years since the advisor’s first
published article (which enters the models both linearly and quadratically, denoted by AdvTenure
and AdvTenure2, respectively), and additional (indicator dummy variable) controls to account for
whether or not advisor and advisee have co-authored articles (Coauthorship). Further regressors
are a set of gender interaction terms (Male×AdvFemale, Female×AdvMale, Female×AdvFemale),
as well as 17 dummies for the academic field of interest (Field). The regression intercept gives
the predicted publication output for the group against which comparisons are made, namely male
student with male advisor, specialised in JEL field A (i.e., General Economics, Teaching), and
without co-authored articles with advisor.
−−−−−−−−− Table 1 about here −−−−−−−−−
Before presenting the regression results, Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics of the
variables, separately for students who obtained their terminal degree from a Top 25 institution
and those who did not. As previously discussed, there is no substantial difference in the number of
articles published by students from Top 25 institutions as compared to the rest; however, noticeable
differences are found when the comparison is based on measures adjusted by quality (i.e., 0.922
and 0.497 QJEe articles on average respectively for Top 25 institutions and the rest).
With respect to advisor quality, the average number of QJEe articles in Top 25 institutions
is about three times the average observed in the rest of institutions (8.6 and 3.0, respectively).
Although researchers in top institutions tend to be more productive on average, there are also
highly productive individuals in the rest of institutions, as illustrated in Figure 4. In terms of
co-authorship with the advisor, the percentage of students who do so in top institutions is lower
(24.5%) than that observed in the students from non-top institutions (38.5%). The average number
of years of experience of the advisors is about the same regardless of the quality of the institution.
Lastly, almost 95% of the students in the sample are advised by a male professor. Around 20% of
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the graduates are female.
−−−−−−−−− Figure 4 about here −−−−−−−−−
Table 2 reports OLS regression results where the dependent variable is the number of QJEe
articles. As can be seen, when one uses all available observations (column (1)) both the prestige
of the advisor (AdvQJEe) and that of the economics department (UniRank) have a positive and
statistically significant effect on the quality-adjusted measure of academic production after 6 years
of graduation. The point estimates are about equal meaning that, ceteris paribus, the effect of a
one-rank decrease in program quality can be offset by having an advisor with one additional QJEe
article.
The tenure (years of expertise) of the advisor has an inverted U-shaped effect (with a maximum
point occurring at about 10 years of experience). Co-authorship with the advisor also has a positive
and statistically significant effect, but it is less than one, both because there may be some crowding-
out of own papers and because we consider here quality adjusted publications, with an overall mean
of 0.6. Female graduates publish fewer papers than their male homologues, but for a given advisee,
the difference between male and female advisors is statistically insignificant, a finding similar to
that of Hilmer and Hilmer (2007).
To capture potential heterogeneous effects of advisor quality conditional on institution quality,
we use the aforementioned distinction between Top 25 economics departments and the rest. This
differentiation reveals an interesting pattern. Indeed, although in the case of Top 25 institutions
(column (2)) the advisor prestige is not statistically significant, co-authorship plays a role in the
student academic productivity. One potential explanation is that the faculty composition in terms
of research quality tends to be more homogeneous in these institutions, while a more heterogeneous
composition exists for economics departments in lower ranks.9 In addition, it might be the case
that peer effects are stronger in top institutions, driven by higher quality students interacting in
a better environment (e.g., high quality workshops and reading groups). The large magnitude of
the effect of co-authorship on academic production in the Top 25 might also be explained by the
network channel of the advisor, as has been suggested by Colussi (2018).
In sharp contrast, when one estimates the model using the observations for the rest of the
institutions (column (3)), the point estimate of advisor quality is statistically significant and about
three times that obtained for the full sample, while the prestige of the economics department
9Qualitatively similar findings, not reported here for brevity but available upon request, are obtained for the Top
50 institutions.
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becomes insignificant. These findings might be seen as providing support for the view that bright
students in non-Top 25 institutions might still be able to achieve a successful research record though
their (close) interaction with the most productive faculty members. Including the interaction
between the number of QJEe articles produced by the advisor with the dummy of advisor co-
authorship (AdvQJEe × Coauth.) as an additional regressor yields a statistically significant positive
coefficient, which appears to be capturing the explicative power of AdvQJEe whose coefficient
becomes insignificant; see columns (4) to (6). Other estimates remain about the same.
To quantify the relevance of advising as a determinant of academic productivity, we use the
estimates in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 to compute the effect of having different advisor quality
in a given environment. In particular, we estimate the differentiated effect on academic production
of having a top quality advisor compared to the case of an “average” one, within a framework in
which both advisor and advisee are co-authors. To this end, we assume a top advisor is one for
whom AdvQJEe=14.8; this is the average number of QJEe articles associated to the Top 20 advisors
in the Top 25 economics departments in the sample. As a benchmark, the average number of QJEe
articles for an “average” advisor is assumed to be equal to AdvQJEe=4.4, which is consistent
with the average value observed in all the sample. The resulting estimated change in academic
production for a graduate from a Top 25 institution, maintaining everything else the same, is 0.4
(with a standard deviation of 0.07). Performing the same counterfactual exercise for a student from
the rest of departments, the change in academic production is estimated to be equal to 0.63 (with
a standard deviation of 0.13). When compared to the average number of quality-adjusted papers
(ArtQJEe=0.60), these changes in academic production amount to approximately 67% and 104%,
respectively. Conducting a similar counter-factual exercise under the assumption that advisor and
advisee have not co-authored papers, the change in quality-adjusted production is -0.036 (with
standard deviation of 0.07) for a Top 25 economics graduate, and 0.31 (with standard deviation
of 0.13) for the rest. This finding highlights that the advisor’s influence on students through their
direct cooperation is pretty important.
Of course, the effect of co-authorship on output is partly mechanical, because it requires at
least one publication by the graduate. As an alternative, we consider in Table 3 results when
the dependent variable excludes the number of QJEe articles co-authored with the advisor. The
estimated coefficients are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2. For example, in the
case of the gender interactions, the estimated coefficients are all negative and in several cases
statistically significance. Likewise, the main conclusion regarding the contributions of institution
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and advisor quality on academic productivity continue to hold (see columns (5) and (6)); that is,
the former has a positive and statistically significant effect for Top 25 institutions, while advisor
quality is important among the rest of the institutions. Interestingly, although the individual effect
of Coauthorship in a Top 25 department is statistically insignificant (i.e., -0.048 with a standard
error of 0.114), when it is interacted with AdvQJEe the overall effect becomes positive for given
advisor quality values above 3 QJEe articles (recall that the average value of AdvQJEe within Top
25 institutions is 8.6 QJEe articles).
4.2 Poisson-pseudo maximum likelihood results
While the number of articles published is a proper count, the number of QJE-equivalent articles is
not. Yet it shares two key aspects of a count, a discrete probability mass at zero and a necessarily
non-negative mean. In such a situation, it is useful to consider an exponential regression model,
E(yi|xi) = exp(x
′
i
β). In contrast to OLS, this approach always yields non-negative predictions,
and moreover is easy to interpret as the coefficients are (constant) semi-elasticities.10 In principle,
a number of consistent estimators of the parameters of the exponential conditional expectation
model are available, including non-linear least squares. Here, we shall follow the advice of Santos
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) who, based on an extensive set of Monte Carlo simulations, recommend
using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator, which implies an unweighted
zero-correlation moment condition between the residuals and the covariates.
The results of applying the PPML estimation procedure to the quality-adjusted measure of
academic production are summarised in Table 4, where columns (1) to (3) display the results
when using ArtQJEe as dependent variable, while (4) to (6) present those for ArtQJEeNet. For
example, based on column (1), a coauthorship increased the number of QJE equivalent papers by
28.4 percent, ceteris paribus. We also find that the quality of the economics department (UniRank)
has a positive and statistically significant effect, with a point estimate that is much smaller for
the Top 25 departments than for the rest of them. The number of QJEe papers of the advisor is
positive and statistically significant only for the rest of departments. Gender interactions, when
statistically significant, have a negative effect on the number of QJEe articles of students, regardless
of whether the number of articles co-authored with the advisor are deducted or not. The PPML
results regarding the differential role of advisor quality in the two groups of institutions remain
10As pointed out by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), estimating a linear regression model on the log-transformed
dependent variable is not advisable, first because it cannot deal with zero outcomes (for ArtQJEe, approximately
10% of the cases are zeros), and second, because parameters can be interpreted as semi-elasticities only under very
strong independence assumptions (e.g. the absence of heteroskedasticity) that are often violated in practice.
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stable. Also, although the point estimates of UniRank are now positive and statistically significant
for both Top 25 and the rest of institutions, the associated semi-elasticity is much larger for the
top institutions (i.e., 0.259 as opposed to 0.074).
One thing to check for a PPML specification is whether or not the conditional variance V (yi|x)
is proportional to the conditional expectation E(yi|x), i.e., λ1 = 1 in V (yi|x) = λ0E(yi|x)
λ1 . While
proportionality is not necessary for the consistency of the estimator, other methods would be more
efficient if it failed in the application. We therefore report at the bottom of Table 4 results for
Gauss-Newton regression (GNR) test (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006)). In a few instances,
the null of proportionality is rejected, but mostly it holds (see in particular also Table 5). We
also estimated models with a quadratic variance function but since the results were qualitatively
similar, they are not reported here.
Thus far, our empirical analysis has been unequivocal in terms of relevance of advisor and in-
stitution quality on total academic production, and also with respect to the differentiated effect
for groups of economics departments. However, every now and then one ends up discussing with
colleagues the potential benefits between publishing a high number of articles as opposed to pub-
lishing only a few ones in top journals. To examine this, we transform the dependent variable yi
so that it is no longer continuous, but a count that measures the number of articles published in
a Top 25 journal. It ought to be remembered that the specific ranking of journals that we use is
also constructed from RePEc, based on a simple index of the ratio between number of citations
and number of published articles; see Appendix A. Once again, the parameters of the model can
be estimated using PPML, because of the fact that the values of the resulting dependent variable
are non-negative integers. The results, reported in columns (1) to (3) of Table 5, reveal that the
quality of the advisor is not statistically significant for students from Top 25 institutions but for
those from the rest. Co-authoring with the advisor increases the chances of publishing in a Top 25
journal, regardless of whether one is considering a student from a Top 25 economics department or
not. As for the quality of economics department, it is significant for Top 25 institutions but not for
the rest. However, when the coverage of the dependent variable is doubled in size so that it is now
defined as the number of publications in Top 50 journals (columns (4) to (6)), then the quality of
economics departments become positive and statistically significant for both Top 25 institutions as
well as for the rest of them. The point estimates for gender interactions are negative and statisti-
cally significant for female students who worked with male advisors. Finally, the GNR test reveals
that the proportionality condition of the conditional variance is valid in all estimated models.
12
5 Concluding remarks
The key finding of our study is that the negative effect of attending a less prestigious PhD program
can, at least in part, be compensated for by the benefit of working with a research-active and
successful advisor. One potential explanation for this finding is that advisors in top-ranked depart-
ments are very busy and have less time to spend with their advisees, as compared to supervisors
in lesser ranked departments. For some supportive evidence, note that the co-authorship rate in
Top 25 institutions is 24.5 percent, and thus substantially lower than the 38.5 percent in other
departments. From the perspective of the students, it may well be that there is a true choice to be
made between being a “small fish in a big pond” or rather being a “big fish in a small pond”.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Institution
Top 25 Rest All
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Articles 4.714 3.773 5.247 5.350 5.117 5.016
ArtQJEe 0.922 1.059 0.497 0.616 0.601 0.770
ArtQJEeNet 0.810 0.969 0.410 0.567 0.507 0.708
AdvQJEe 8.638 10.192 2.968 3.427 4.351 6.333
Coauthorship 0.245 0.430 0.385 0.487 0.351 0.477
AdvTenure 16.751 6.783 15.307 6.721 15.659 6.763
UniRank 0.274 0.304 0.010 0.013 0.074 0.189
Male × AdvMale 0.737 0.441 0.694 0.461 0.704 0.456
Male × AdvFemale 0.046 0.209 0.046 0.210 0.046 0.210
Female × AdvMale 0.201 0.401 0.238 0.426 0.229 0.420
Female × AdvFemale 0.017 0.128 0.021 0.145 0.020 0.141
Observations 482 482 1494 1494 1976 1976
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Table 2: OLS results for ArtQJEe
Institution Institution
All Top 25 Rest All Top 25 Rest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AdvQJEe 0.012∗ 0.001 0.037∗ 0.003 -0.004 0.029∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012)
Coauthorship 0.243∗ 0.555∗ 0.188∗ 0.119∗ 0.386∗ 0.139∗
(0.037) (0.129) (0.033) (0.038) (0.125) (0.045)
AdvQJEe × Coauth. 0.032∗ 0.021∗ 0.017
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016)
AdvTenure 0.019∗ 0.021 0.015 0.019∗ 0.020 0.016†
(0.009) (0.026) (0.009) (0.009) (0.026) (0.009)
AdvTenure2 -0.001∗ -0.001 -0.001∗ -0.001∗ -0.001 -0.001∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
UniRank×102 0.011∗ 0.010∗ 0.021 0.012∗ 0.011∗ 0.022
(0.002) (0.002) (0.016 (0.002) (0.002) (0.016)
Male × AdvFemale -0.103 -0.261† -0.043 -0.111 -0.264† -0.047
(0.071) (0.150) (0.080) (0.071) (0.151) (0.080)
Female × AdvMale -0.158∗ -0.244∗ -0.163∗ -0.159∗ -0.237∗ -0.164∗
(0.032) (0.090) (0.030) (0.032) (0.090) (0.030)
Female × AdvFemale -0.123 0.060 -0.143∗ -0.124 0.056 -0.146∗
(0.097) (0.394) (0.059) (0.095) (0.386) (0.059)
Constant 0.491 0.675 0.445 0.542 0.727 0.466
(0.104) (0.312) (0.078) (0.104) (0.310) (0.080)
Observations 1976 482 1494 1976 482 1494
Field dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.197 0.284 0.128 0.210 0.291 0.130
Standard errors in parentheses. † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05.
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Table 3: OLS results for ArtQJEeNet
Institution Institution
All Top 25 Rest All Top 25 Rest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AdvQJEe 0.011∗ 0.002 0.032∗ 0.005 -0.002 0.029∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012)
Coauthorship -0.023 0.097 -0.036 -0.104∗ -0.048 -0.055
(0.032) (0.109) (0.030) (0.033) (0.114) (0.040)
AdvQJEe × Coauth. 0.021∗ 0.018† 0.007
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
AdvTenure 0.015† 0.013 0.013 0.015† 0.012 0.013
(0.009) (0.025) (0.009) (0.009) (0.025) (0.009)
AdvTenure2 -0.001† -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.001† -0.000 -0.001∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
UniRank×102 0.009∗ 0.009∗ 0.017 0.010∗ 0.094∗ 0.017
(0.002) (0.002) (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.016)
Male × AdvFemale -0.096 -0.258† -0.038 -0.102 -0.261† -0.040
(0.068) (0.142) (0.076) (0.068) (0.143) (0.076)
Female × AdvMale -0.148∗ -0.243∗ -0.145∗ -0.149∗ -0.237∗ -0.145∗
(0.029) (0.086) (0.028) (0.029) (0.086) (0.028)
Female × AdvFemale -0.102 0.073 -0.127∗ -0.102 0.069 -0.128∗
(0.094) (0.393) (0.053) (0.093) (0.387) (0.053)
Constant 0.492 0.689 0.443 0.525 0.733 0.451
(0.100) (0.306) (0.073) (0.100) (0.304) (0.074)
Observations 1976 482 1494 1976 482 1494
Field dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.173 0.248 0.092 0.180 0.254 0.093
Standard errors in parentheses. † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05.
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Table 4: PPML estimates for number of QJE equivalent articles
ArtQJEe ArtQJEeNet
Institution Institution
All Top 25 Rest All Top 25 Rest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AdvQJEe 0.008 0.002 0.058∗ 0.007 0.002 0.057∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.019) (0.005) (0.005) (0.019)
Coauthorship 0.284∗ 0.463∗ 0.377∗ -0.181∗ -0.024 -0.095
(0.056) (0.114) (0.080) (0.066) (0.142) (0.091)
AdvQJEe × Coauth. 0.016∗ 0.006 -0.004 0.021∗ 0.012† 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.019) (0.006) (0.007) (0.019)
AdvTenure 0.032∗ 0.017 0.039∗ 0.031† 0.008 0.041†
(0.016) (0.027) (0.020) (0.018) (0.030) (0.023)
AdvTenure2 -0.001∗ -0.001 -0.002∗ -0.001† -0.000 -0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
UniRank×102 0.011∗ 0.009∗ 0.057∗ 0.011∗ 0.008∗ 0.055†
(0.013) (0.001) (0.028) (0.001) (0.001) (0.032)
Male × AdvFemale -0.172 -0.307 -0.090 -0.188 -0.341 -0.097
(0.141) (0.227) (0.179) (0.156) (0.240) (0.200)
Female × AdvMale -0.290∗ -0.214∗ -0.371∗ -0.324∗ -0.268∗ -0.388∗
(0.061) (0.101) (0.071) (0.067) (0.111) (0.079)
Female × AdvFemale -0.207 0.141 -0.352∗ -0.201 0.145 -0.383∗
(0.197) (0.370) (0.150) (0.225) (0.386) (0.172)
Constant -0.598 -0.205 -0.898 -0.619 -0.183 -0.901
(0.156) (0.266) (0.176) (0.177) (0.300) (0.200)
Observations 1976 482 1494 1976 482 1494
Field dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 0.222 0.341 0.136 0.189 0.292 0.093
p-val GNR 0.013 0.148 0.030 0.005 0.270 0.025
λ1 1.385 1.253 1.438 1.313 1.180 1.474
se(λ1) 0.126 0.174 0.130 0.090 0.169 0.103
Standard errors in parentheses. † p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05.
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Table 5: PPML estimates for number of articles published in top journals
Top 25 journals Top 50 journals
All Top 25 Rest All Top 25 Rest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AdvQJEe 0.012† 0.002 0.130∗ 0.012∗ 0.004 0.084∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.026) (0.005) (0.005) (0.022)
Coauthorship 0.197† 0.594∗ 0.398∗ 0.159∗ 0.425∗ 0.290∗
(0.104) (0.153) (0.168) (0.078) (0.130) (0.116)
AdvQJEe × Coauth. 0.021∗ 0.003 -0.026 0.023∗ 0.009 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.029) (0.007) (0.006) (0.023)
AdvTenure -0.000 -0.018 0.031 0.016 -0.016 0.040
(0.027) (0.033) (0.042) (0.022) (0.030) (0.032)
AdvTenure2 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
UniRank×102 0.016∗ 0.009∗ 0.072 0.013∗ 0.008∗ 0.102∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.055) (0.001) (0.001) (0.038)
Male × AdvFemale -0.253 -0.319 -0.189 -0.208 -0.285 -0.171
(0.244) (0.340) (0.329) (0.188) (0.262) (0.256)
Female × AdvMale -0.256∗ -0.198 -0.403∗ -0.183∗ -0.200† -0.220∗
(0.102) (0.128) (0.154) (0.080) (0.109) (0.107)
Female × AdvFemale 0.126 0.428 -0.170 -0.038 0.214 -0.258
(0.302) (0.349) (0.310) (0.242) (0.303) (0.252)
Constant -0.584 0.038 -1.376 0.068 0.698 -0.489†
(0.249) (0.316) (0.389) (0.199) (0.277) (0.273)
Observations 1976 482 1494 1976 482 1494
Field dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo R2 0.171 0.269 0.086 0.187 0.305 0.101
p-val GNR 0.090 0.662 0.034 0.148 0.707 0.107
λ1 1.162 1.077 1.386 1.174 0.937 1.260
se(λ1) 0.089 0.180 0.103 0.124 0.159 0.160
Standard errors in parentheses
†
p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
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A Appendix: List of top journals
(1) Quarterly Journal of Economics; (2) Journal of Economic Literature; (3) Journal of Political
Economy; (4) Econometrica; (5) Journal of Economic Growth; (6) Journal of Financial Economics;
(7) Review of Economic Studies; (8) Journal of Economic Perspectives; (9) Journal of Finance;
(10) Economic Policy; (11) Review of Financial Studies; (12) American Economic Review; (13)
Journal of Monetary Economics; (14) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; (15) Journal of La-
bor Economics; (16) Journal of Econometrics; (17) American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics;
(18) Journal of the European Economic Association; (19) Economic Journal; (20) Rand Journal of
Economics; (21) Review of Economics and Statistics; (22) Journal of Applied Econometrics; (23)
World Bank Economic Review; (24) Journal of Human Resources; (25) American Economic Jour-
nal: Applied Economics; (26) Journal of International Economics; (27) Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics; (28) Journal of Public Economics; (29) Journal of Financial Intermediation;
(30) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management; (31) Foundations and Trends(R) in
Econometrics; (32) Journal of Economic Surveys; (33) Experimental Economics; (34) Journal of
Development Economics; (35) Review of Economic Dynamics; (36) Journal of Economic Theory;
(37) Journal of Law and Economics; (38) European Economic Review; (39) International Economic
Review; (40) Journal of Accounting and Economics; (41) World Bank Research Observer; (42) An-
nual Review of Economics; (43) American Economic Journal: Economic Policy; (44) Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty; (45) International Journal of Central Banking; (46) Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking; (47) Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics; (48) Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization; (49) Journal of International Business Studies; (50) IMF Economic Review.
The list does no include the Journal of Business, which stopped being published in 2006. Similarly,
Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleve-
land; Western Economic Developments, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; and Quarterly
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, are not included either because they tend to rely on
invited papers.
B Appendix: List of top departments
(1) Harvard; (2) MIT; (3) Princeton; (4) UC-Berkeley; (5) Chicago; (6) Oxford; (7) Paris School of
Economics; (8) Stanford; (9) NYU; (10) Toulouse School of Economics; (11) Columbia; (12) Yale;
(13) Brown; (14) Boston; (15) Barcelona Graduate School of Economics; (16) UC-San Diego; (17)
Dartmouth College; (18) Michigan; (19) Pennsylvania; (20) LSE; (21) Northwestern; (22) UCL;
(23) Columbia (Finance); (24) British Columbia; (25) Wisconsin-Madison.
C Appendix: Field classification
The capital letter in parentheses is the JEL classification. The three small-case letters in parentheses
refer to the nep classification.
(A) General Economics, Teaching: (soc) Social Norms and Social Capital, (sog) Sociology of Eco-
nomics.
(B) History of Economic Thought, Methodology, Heterodox Approaches: (hme) Heterodox Mi-
croeconomics, (hpe) History and Philosophy of Economics, (pke) Post Keynesian Economics, (pol)
Positive Political Economics.
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(C) Mathematical, Quantitative Methods: (big) Big Data, (cmp) Computational Economics, (dcm)
Discrete Choice Models, (ecm) Econometrics, (evo) Evolutionary Economics, (exp) Experimental
Economics, (for) Forecasting, (gth) Game Theory, (ore) Operations Research.
(D) Microeconomics: (cbe) Cognitive and Behavioural Economics, (cdm) Collective Decision-
Making, (cta) Contract Theory and Applications, (des) Economic Design, (ets) Econometric Time
Series, (ipr) Intellectual Property Rights, (knm) Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy,
(mic) Microeconomics, (net) Network Economics, (neu) Neuroeconomics, (upt) Utility Models and
Prospect Theory.
(E) Macroeconomics, Monetary Economics: (ban) Banking, (cba) Central Banking, (dge) Dynamic
General Equilibrium, (eff) Efficiency and Productivity, (gro) Economic Growth, (mac) Macroe-
conomics, (mon) Monetary Economics, (opm) Open Economy Macroeconomics, (pay) Payment
Systems and Financial Technology.
(F) International Economics: (ifn) International Finance, (int) International Trade.
(G) Financial Economics: (cfn) Corporate Finance, (fdg) Financial Development and Growth, (fin)
Finance, (fle) Financial Literacy and Education, (fmk) Financial Markets, (ias) Insurance Eco-
nomics, (mfd) Microfinance, (mst) Market Microstructure, (ppm) Project, Program and Portfolio
Management, (rmg) Risk Management.
(H) Public Economics: (pbe) Public Economics, (pub) Public Finance.
(I) Health, Education, Welfare: (edu) Education, (hea) Health Economics.
(J) Labor, Demographic Economics: (age) Economics of Ageing, (dem) Demographic Economics,
(gen) Gender, (hap) Economics of Happiness, (hrm) Human Capital and Human Resource Man-
agement, (lab) Labour Economics, (lma) Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, and Wages, (ltv)
Unemployment, Inequality and Poverty, (mig) Economics of Human Migration.
(K) Law and Economics: (law) Law and Economics.
(L) Industrial Organization: (com) Industrial Competition, (ent) Entrepreneurship, (ind) Industrial
Organization, (nps) Nonprofit & Public Sector, (reg) Regulation, (tid) Technology and Industrial
Dynamics.
(M) Business Administration & Business Economics, Marketing, Accounting, Personnel Economics:
(acc) Accounting and Auditing, (bec) Business Economics, (cse) Economics of Strategic Manage-
ment, (his) Business, Economic and Financial History, (mkt) Marketing, (sbm) Small Business
Management,
(O) Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, Growth: (afr) Africa, (ara) Middle
East & North Africa, (cna) China, (cis) Confederation of Independent States, (cwa) Central &
Western Asia, (dev) Development, (eec) European Economics, (eur) Microeconomic European Is-
sues, (ino) Innovation, (iue) Informal and Underground Economics, (lam) Central & South America,
(sea) South East Asia, (tra) Transition Economics.
(Q) Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental & Ecological Economics: (agr)
Agricultural Economics, (ene) Energy Economics, (env) Environmental Economics, (res) Resource
Economics.
(R) Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, Transportation Economics: (geo) Economic Geography,
(tre) Transport Economics, (ure) Urban and Real Estate Economics.
(Z) Other Special Topics: (cul) Cultural Economics, (ger) German Papers, (ict) Information and
Communication Technologies, (spo) Sports and Economics, (tur) Tourism Economics.
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